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RECENT CASES
Crimunal Law-Prostitution-Placing Female m House of Prostitution. D, the operator of a brothel, was charged with wilfully and unlawfully placing a female in a
house of prostitution with intent that such female should live a life of prostitution.
Such act is specifically made a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than
one year, nor more than five years, by REm REv. STAT. § 2440-(1) [P P C. § 118191-Ml)]. No evidence was introduced at the trial as to how the female in question
came to reside in D's establishment, although it was clear she was a common prostitute, practicing her "profession" there to D's knowledge. Conviction in the trial court.
Held. Reversed. It was not the purpose of REM. REv. STAT. § 2440-(l), supra, to
make the operation of a house of prostitution illegal. Rather, it was directed against
procurers and panders, and to constitute the crime of "placing" a female there must be
a finding that the defendant did more than merely furnish a place and opportunity to
a female to practice her trade. Further, there are other statutes in this state operating
directly against houses of prostitution, so the use of Section 2440-(l) is not necessary
for this purpose. State v. Basden, 131 Wash. Dec. 61, 196 P.(2d) 308 (1948).
The other statutes mentioned by the court are REm. REY. STAT. § 2688, subd. 3
[P P C. § 118-269], Rx b REv. STAT. § 9924 [P P C. § 81-47], and REm. REv. STAT.
§ 9925 [P P. C. § 81-49]. However, as pointed out by the dissent, Sections 9924 and
9925 are not part of the criminal code, but provide for the abatement of houses of prostitution as nuisances and for a fine not to exceed $1,000 which may be levied against
anyone erecting, causing, or contriving such nuisances. The other section, REM. REv.
STAT. § 2688, stpra, is the vagrancy statute, and includes as one of its offenses the
keeping of a house of prostitution. The maximum penalty under this statute is six
months in the county jail, or a fine of $500.
The court seems correct in interpreting the word "place" in REm. REv. STAT. §
2440-(1) to mean that the person charged thereunder must perform some affirmative
act. However, Section 2440 is the only statute in this state making acts connected with
prostitution felonies. Since operation of a house of prostitution is not within this
statute, our code does not provide an adequate deterrent.
The instant decision criticizes and overrules the contrary construction placed on this
section in State v. Hanes, 84 Wash. 601, 147 Pac. 193 (1915) and the unlikelihood of a
return to the former position would seem to indicate the appropriateness of legislative
action to fill the gap.
M.D.A.
Criminal Law-Escape-Rem. Rev. Stat. § 2342. D was convicted under REM. RELv.
STAT. § 2342 (P P C. § 114-109) making it a crime to "escape or attempt to escape
from.. prison .. by force or fraud." By conjecture, it appeared that D had hidden
in the prison yard and had later scaled the wall with the aid of a basketball backstop
post which (in a manner unknown) had been broken off at its base and placed against
the wall. On appeal, the court reversed the conviction (stating that penal statutes must
be strictly construed) and held: the word "force" connotes common law prison breach
and, by way of analogy to burglary breaking, there must be a removal of some obstacle
to exit which, if left untouched, would prevent such exit. State v. Hoffmant, 130 Wash.
Dec. 439, 191 P.(2d) 865 (1948).
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The state's case was weakened by an absence of "direct evidence" as to the precise
manner in which D had effected his escape. But even if it could have shown that D had
broken off the post and leaned it against the wall, the result would probably have been
the same. As pointed out in the appellant's brief, the post never constituted an "obstacle
to exit."
The technical construction given the statute has ample authority from the common
law. The presence or absence of the element of "force" distinguished the crimes of
"prison breach" and "escape." Rex v. Has'well, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 458, 168 Eng. Rep.
896 (1821). To constitute "prison breach," it is necessary that an actual breaking occur.
State v. King, 114 Iowa 413, 87 N. W 282 (1901). In the case last cited, the prisoner
concealed himself in the prison work quarry outside the wall and later escaped when
the other prisoners were being returned to their cells. The court said that "escape by
strategem" was not sufficient to constitute a prison breach. Query: Did the Washington
Legislature, in its use of the word "fraud," mean to include "escape by strategem"
(which would seem to be the only common law counterpart) or must resort be had to
the several elements constituting actionable "fraud" in this state? One cannot but feel
that the Legislature reasonably believed that, aside from a wide open prison gate, the
ords "force or fraud" would cover all manner of improper egress.
C.L.S.
Real 'Estate Brokers-Termination of Agency. D signed a listing contract with P, a
licensed real estate broker, by which P was appointed exclusive agent until July 1 for
the sale of realty owned by D By a letter written April 16, D stated that he would
like to withdraw the listing until a later date, and asked that he be notified when this
was done. On M1y 13, D refused to sell to a prospective purchaser presented by P
In the trial court, P recovered the broker's commission. Appeal. Held: Affirmed. The
letter of April 16 was only an expression of a desire to terminate the contract, and
there was no breach until D refused to pay the commission after a purchaser had been
procured. McGillivray v. Neilson, 130 Wash. Dec. 549, 192 P (2d) 369 (1948).
In the usual real estate broker's contract, the broker's authority may be revoked
by the owner at any time, provided the revocation is in good faith. Arcweld Mfg. Co.
v. Burney, 12 Wn.(2d) 212, 121 P.(2d) 350 (1942), Robertson v. Wilson, 121
Wash. 358, 209 Pac. 841 (1922). The general rule is that the authority of an agent
is revoked by words or other conduct reasonably indicating that the principal no
longer consents to have the agent act for him. Santangelo v. Midlesex Theatre, 125
Conn. 572, 7 A.(2d) 430 (1939), War Finance Corp. v. Ready, 2 Tenn. App. 61
(1925)
However, a listing agreement is at least a revocable continuing offer, which becomes a valid contract upon performance of its terms. Higgins v. Egbert, 28 Wn.
(2d) 313, 182 P.(2d) 58 (1947) , Lasswell v. Anderson, 127 Wash. 591, 221 Pac. 300
(1923). The Washington court has said that the renunciation of an offer to contract
should be in substance as explicit and definite as a renunciation of the contract after
the acceptance. Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. O'Neil, 48 Wash. 176, 93 Pac. 214 (1908).
The principal case follows Victor Safe & Lock Co., but would seem to be contrary
to the general rule that an agency may be revoked by any indication of intention to
discontinue the relationship.
The cases might be reconciled by differentiating between the exclusive agency
for a limited period of time and the ordinary agency. Where an owner gives a broker
an exclusive agency for a fixed period of time in consideration of the broker's devoting
time and money to the sale, there is a valid bilateral contract. Hunter v. Wenatchee
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Land Co., 50 Wash. 438, 97 Pac. 494 (1908). In such a contract, the agent's agreement to faithfully perform is sufficient consideration for the principal's implied agreement not to revoke. State ex rel. Everett Trust & Say. Bank v. Pacific Waxed Paper
Co., 22 Wn. (2d) 844, 157 P (2d) 707 (1945). If a revocation of such a contract
amounts to a breach of contract, it should be governed by the usual contract principles
requiring an explicit statement. The principle that renunciation, i.e., an unqualified
and positive refusal to perform before performance is due, is a breach of contract is
applied in cases of contracts to act as agent. Casey v. Murphy, 143 Wash. 17, 253 Pac.
1078 (1927). On the other hand, it could be argued that the ordinary revocable listing
agreement, involving a special relationship as it does, should not be governed by the
Victor Safe & Lock Co. rule, which applies generally to offers and contracts. The
relation of principal and agent is essentially a personal relation, and the principal, if he
so desires, may revoke the authority of the agent at any time, as it is contrary to the
policy of the law to compel him to employ another against his will, although he may,
of course, be liable in damages for any breach of contract. Gibson v. Green, 174 Ark.
1010, S. W 209 (1927).
J.R.L.

Statute of Frauds-Requisites and Sufficiency of a Written Description of Land by
Street and Number. In an action for unpaid rent, D set up, inter alia, the plea of
statute of frauds. D and owner of house had signed a document, properly acknowledged
by the owner, designated as a "real estate lease," which provided in part that D
should occupy the home for a period beginning June 1, 1941, and ending August 20,
1942, with an option to purchase during that time. The property was described as "a
house at 2622 W Fairview." Held. affirming judgment for D, the description is
insufficient to designate the location of the premises without the use of parol evidence,
hence the lease agreement is invalid under the statute of frauds. Bonded Adjustment
Co. v. Edmunds, 28 Wn. (2d) 110, 182 P. (2d) 17 (1948).
It is generally regarded as sufficient if the writing identifies the property when it
is read in the light of the circumstances of possession or ownership and of the situation of the parties when the negotiations took place and the writing was made.
Garden City Sand Co. v. Miller, 157 Ill. 225, 41 N.E. 753 (1895), Matherly v,
Wright, 171 Ky. 264, 188 S.W 385 (1916), Flegel v. Dowling, 54 Ore. 40 ,102 Pac.
178, 135 Am. ST. REiP. 812, 19 ANN. CAS. 1159 (1909), McDermott v. Reiter, 279 P
545, 124 Atl. 187 (1924), Sholovitz v. Noorzgan, 42 R. I. 282, 107 Atl. 94 (1919),
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 12 Wn.(2d) 589, 123 P.(2d) 335 (1942), Heller v. Baird,
191 Wis. 288, 210 N.W 680 (1926). It seems to be practically unquestioned that in
addition to the street and number the city or town must be identified by the writing,
Broadway Hospital v. Decker, 47 Wash. 586, 102 Pac. 178 (1907), and considerable
controversy has been had as to what constitutes a sufficient designation of the name
of the place where the street is locate& Reference in the writing to the property by
street and number is usually considered sufficient where the city or town is stated
either in the caption or body of the instrument or may be ascertained from the
writing. Engler v. Garrett, 100 Md. 387, 59 AtI. 648 (1905), Mead v. Parker, 115
Mass. 413, 20 Am. Rep. 110 (1874), Sanders v. McNutt, 147 Ohio St. 408, 72 N.E.(2d)
72 (1947). An acknowledgment of the deed by the vendor would be particularly suitable
for tlus purpose and has been so used. Easterlingv. Simmons, 293 S. W 690 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927), Gage v. Cameron, 212 Ill. 146, 72 N. E. 204 (1904). The fact of ownership
by the grantor has been emphasized by other courts in the ascertainment of the property. Gendelinan v. Mengillo, 96 Conn. 541, 114 Atl. 914 (1921), Hayden v. Perkins,
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119 Ky. 188, 83 S. W 128 (1904). Also as illustrative that the omission of the name of
the city or state is immaterial in view of ownership where description is made by street
and number see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 207 (b) and illustration (1932).
In reaching the result of the principal case, the court relied chiefly on the earlier
case of Broadway Hospital v. Decker, supra, involving as the present case the sufficiency of the description of urban property by street and number. In that opinion the
court said, "We think a description which may be referred to any city in the world a
street of the name may exist is too indefinite to satisfy even the most liberal view
of the statute of frauds." Eight other Washington cases are then cited in the instant
case as following the rule of the Decker case. It is to be noted that in all either the
extent of the property involved was attempted to be shown by parol evidence or that
REM. REv. STAT. 5825 (1905)
(the Broker's Commission Statute) was applied.
Obviously, parol evidence would be inadmissible in the former type of case under
the rule forbidding extrinsic evidence which seeks to add to or vary the terms of a
written agreement concerning land. In the latter cases, the Washington court has
been inclined to adhere to a strict interpretation of the statute, supra. See Roger v.
Lippy, 99 Wash. 312, 169 Pac. 858, (1918), where the court reaffirming the strict
application of the earlier case of Thompson v. English, 76 Wash. 23, 135 Pac. 664
(1913) states: "There are, we think, no decisions of this court dealing with the
sufficiency of land descriptions in commission contracts out of harmony with the
views expressed in Thompson v. English [supra], or those decisions following the
one rendered in that case."
Where, as in the principal case, there is no dispute as to the extent of the property
involved, parol evidence should be admissible to show the situation and relation of
the parties and the surrounding circumstances, to identify the property referred to in
the agreement. Cushing v. Monarch Timber Co., 75 Wash. 678, 135 Pac. 660, ANN.
CAs. 1914C, 1239 (1913) Actually, the question in such a situation would seem to be
one concerning the right to resort to parol evidence to aid the writing rather than
the adequacy of an instrument under the statute of frauds. Mead v. Parker,supra. The
statute of frauds requires only that the writing itself afford a means by which the
property sold can be identified, and while parol evidence is not admissible to add or
to vary the writing, it is admissible to designate the subject matter already identified
in the minds of the parties. That the Washington court recognizes the rule admxtting
parol evidence to identify the property the grantor intended to convey see Thompson v.
Stack, 21 Wn.(2d) 193, 150 P.(2d) 387 (1944), and cases there cited. In Wetzler
v. Vichols, 53 Wash. 285, 101 Pac. 867 (1909), the court (citing an Illinois case)
said. "A devise or grant will only be held void for uncertainty where, after resort to
oral proof, it still remains a matter of mere conjecture what was intended by the
instrument." For a reaffirmation of this view see Martinson v. Cruikshank. 3 Wn. (2d)
565, 123 P.(2d) 335 (1940).
In view of these decisions, the admissibility of parol evidence in Washington, as in
the great majority of jurisdictions, is dependent upon a recognition of the difference
between oral testimony seeking to prove quantum and that attempting to show location
of the premises. The collective impression gained from the cases is that the broad language found in the Decker case has never been given the unqualified application contended for it in the Ednmunds case. It is suggested that the refusal of the court in the
latter case to apply the distinction above noted is a departure from precedent of long
standing in this jurisdiction.
S.C.R.
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Veterans-Contracts for the Purchase of Real Estate-The "G. I. Bill." D, a veteran,
entered into an earnest money contract with X to purchase property for $6,450. The
funds were to be obtained through a "G. I. Loan," a fact known to all parties, although
the agreement made no mention of it. Federal appraisers determined that the reasonable value of the property was $6,300. The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944,
38 U.S.C.A. 694a, provides that loans thereunder are guaranteed only if the price of
the property does not exceed the value determined by the appraiser. D's application
for a loan was denied and he was unable to rpuse funds elsewhere to complete the
transaction. P, X's real estate agent, in good faith, told D his earnest money was
liable to forfeiture, but to consummate the deal offered to reduce his commission so
that the price would meet the appraised value, in return for which D was to make
an additional purchase of an adjoining lot owned by P D acquiesced, but after completing the purchase of the main lot, attempted to rescind the collateral agreement. P
sued for money still due and D cross-complained for recission and return of money
already paid, asking that the contract be declared illegal and void as a violation of
tric policy of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act. The trial court gave relief to
neither party.
On appeal, held Reversed. The Supreme Cour held for P, refusing to find the
agreement void as contravening the policy of the "G. I. Bill." Ewing v. Ford, 131
Wash. Dec. 103, 195 P.(2d) 650 (1948).
The exact question presented here seems to have arisen only in Waslhngton. In
Bryant v. Stablein, 28 Wn. (2d) 739, 184 P. (2d) 45 (1947), relied on by the court, the
issue was almost identical. There a payment of "side money" by a veteran was employed
to bring the apparent purchase price below the appraised value. The seller attempted to
rescind on the ground of illegality, but the court enforced the agreement, saying,
"the act relates simply to the conditions under wuch the government will guarantee
the loan to the veteran in the first instance, not to contracts, pending or concluded
between the veteran and third persons."
These holdings are not in accord with the spirit of prior decisions by the Washington court and by the majority in the United States, where private contracts contrary to the policy of federal statutes have been declared void.
Analogous cases are those which involve the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933,
12 U. S. C. A. 1461 et seq., and the National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U. S. C. A.
§ 1709b. In Jones v. Curtis, 20 Wash. (2d) 470, 147 P (2d) 912, (1944) a secret
second mortgage, taken by a mortgage to reimburse him for loss suffered by his
acceptance of an offer of H.O.L.C. bonds in full settlement of the original mortgage
debt, was declared illegal as being at variance with the purpose and policy of the
Home Owners' Loan Act. Accord, cases cited in 110 A.L.R. 250, 121 A.L.R. 119,
125 A.L.R. 800 and Bridewell, Validity of Second Mortgage Taken by Former
Mortgagees in HOLC Refinancing Operations. 5 JoHN M.Rs .LL L. Q. 373 (1940).
Similarly in New York and Oklahoma, courts have refused to help sellers enforce
collateral agreements with purchasers which are violations of the policy of the
Federal Housing Administration as set up in the National Housing Act. Miller v.
Walters, Mun. Ct. 34 N. Y. S.(2d) 341 (1942) and Nichols Bldg. Co. v. Fowler,
197 Okla. 476, 172 P.(2d) 636 (1946).
The policy announced in the cited cases of affording the protection of law to those
whom the federal loan statutes intended to benefit is a sound one, and it would seem
that there should be even greater pressure on the judiciary to protect the veteran
beneficiary of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act. Section 694a, requiring that the
price to be paid by a veteran shall not exceed the reasonable value as established by a
federal appraiser was obviously enacted to protect veterans from acquiring property at
exorbitant prices. That this was the purpose of the legislators is manifest from the
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congressional discussions which occurred at the time S. 1767 (the "G. I. Bill") was
being considered. Congresmonal Record, Vol. 90, Pt. 4, Pp. 4649 for the period from
May 12, 1944 to June 12, 1944. The pronouncements of the Ewing and Bryant cases
do little to extend the intended protection to the veteran, rather they invite sellers in
the future to exact similar collateral promises from the veteran with the assurance that
they will be upheld.
W.A.H.
Labor Law-Nonenjoinable Picketing. The freight ship M. S. Garland was picketed
by the Sailors' Union of the Pacific. It operated under a limited partnership agreement
with the general partner controlling and managing the ship and with the limited partners acting as crew. Berger, the general partner, brought suit to enjoin the union.
Trial court refused injunction. Berger appealed. Held Affirmed. Notwithstanding the
limited partnership agreement, the employer-employee relationship was here present
and three of the employees were union members. A labor dispute, therefore, existed
under Washington's anti-injunction statute. REM. Rxv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) 7612-1,
[P P C. 695-1]. Berger v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 29 Wn.(2d) 810, 189 P.(2d)
173 (1948).
This decision represents the latest case of the Supreme Court with regard to injunctions against picketing. While the decision stays within the limitations laid down in
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P.(2d) 372 (1935),
which was held to be the law in this state by a previous case handed down in this same
term, Gazzam v. Building Service Employees Umon, 29 Wn. (2d) 488, 188 P. (2d) 97
(1947), this case reflects an attitude toward labor union picketing different in at least two
respects from the previous cases: (1) the requirements to which the court refers in refusing an injunction are more liberal, (2) it adds doubt to the scope, if not the validity,
of Blanchardv. Golden Age Breunng Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.(2d) 397 (1936), which
declares three sections of Washington's anti-injunction statute unconstitutional.
The Safeway case and the cases following it seem to lay down two requirements for
nonenjoinable picketing- that the objective be lawful, and that an employer-employee
relationship exist between the strikers and the struck shop. This latter requirement is
satisfied if the controversy is between the employer and the employees and at least some
of the employees are members of the picketing union. Here the objective was lawful,
and an employee-employer relationship was found in which three members of the crew
were union men. These crew members, however, were not working as de facto members
of the union. There was evidence that the union threatened to expel them if they did
not withdraw from this employment. In addition, it was not shown that there was
any disagreement between the employer and his employees. The court said, "the purpose
of the picketing was to persuade appellants to enter into an agreement with the
respondent union.
" As to the employer-employee relationship, four members of the
court in a special concurring opinion seemed to indicate that, so far as they were concerned, a labor dispute existed regardless of the character of the limited partnership,
because some of the limited partners were members of the picketing union. The decision seems to indicate that although stranger picketing will not be allowed, the court
will be liberal in finding that there is a proximate employer-employee relationship, that
there are employees who are members of the picketing union, and that the controversy
is between the employer and his employees.
The majority opinion also cited Section 1 of the Washington anti-injunction statute,
REm. REV. STAT. (1945 Supp.) 7612-1, [P P C. 695-1], as binding law. The dissenting
judges felt that this overruled Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396,
63 P. (2d) 397 (1936). While Section 1, by implication of the Blanchard case, might be
considered unconstitutional, that case expressly declared only Sections 7 8, and 9
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unconstitutional. Sections 7, 8, and 9 set up procedural requirements which must be
met by a court sitting in equity prior to issuance of injunctive relief in a case arising
out of a labor dispute. The same reasoning used m that case to declare Sections 7, 8,
and 9 unconstitutional, i.e., unlawful legislative encroachment upon the court's inherent
equity powers, would remove the force of law from the remainder of this statute. Cases
subsequent to the Blanchard case, however, have treated the remainder of the act at
least as a declaration of public policy to be followed by the court, if not as binding law.
Yakima v. Gocham, 200 Wash. 564, 94 P.(2d) 180 (1939). Section 1 has been cited
several times and is at least treated as law. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett
Distrzct Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, 11 Wn.(2d) 503, 119 P.(2d)
643 (1941), Shzveley v. Garage Employees Labor Union No. 44, 6 Wn. (2d) 560, 108

P.(2d) 354 (1940). The majority opinion is further evidence of the disposition of the
court to treat the Blanchard case as very limited m its effect, thus permitting some
sections of the state anti-injunction statute to be effective.
S.R.B.

